Overall the Secure Firewall was a qualified tool that could be applied to the protection of critical infrastructure and resiliency. Each of the categories listed below are expanded in the text of this report that together comprise a set of criteria for a firewall appliance that is well suited for to protect critical infrastructure assets.
• Defense in depth 
Overview
The purpose of this assessment was to assess the proprietary capabilities of the Secure Firewall (Sidewinder) appliance associated with control system environments. The assessment was conducted in the Electric Infrastructure Operations Center (EIOC) at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The EIOC contains multiple live data feeds from industry as well as an operational Energy Management System (EMS). The EIOC provided both live and replayed data for the assessment.
The goals of the assessment were five fold:
• Identify performance impacts • Identify features that directly support control system security requirements • Identify capabilities that could be customized to better support control system security requirements • Identify where the technology could be used in a control system network • Provide recommendations for technology enhancement
The primary project deliverables include this technical report and participation in future Webinars intended to describe the activities that supported the evaluation of the Secure Firewall.
Features That Support Critical Infrastructure Security
The age and operational requirements of control system and IT networks differ in significant ways. The business network will often replace most of their systems every 3-5 years where control system networks are on a 20-30 year replacement cycle. The control system often requires 24x7x365 reliability where the business systems are typically more able to accommodate short outages. Control systems also operate on implicit trust e.g. if a device receives a valid command it will execute it whether or not it came from a valid operator, where traditional IT networks provide methods for authentication before execution. These fundamental differences and a multitude of others make critical infrastructure security challenging. In today's deregulated bulk electricity environment companies are constantly seeking economical advantages. This has lead to more frequent connections between the once isolated business and the control system networks. In turn this has significantly redefined and increased the threats on control system networks.
Regulatory standards for critical infrastructure systems have/are being developed to help mitigate these threats but they are in their infancy and are expected to change even as of the writing of this assessment. The most complete and thorough set of standards come from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Specific NIST standards applicable to critical infrastructure systems are NIST 800-53 (see industrial control system supplemental guidance information) and SP 800-82 (expected to become a published document in 2009).
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection group of standards (CIP-002 through CIP-009) were written to protect the bulk electric system from cyber events. Pertinent requirements address the monitoring and control of the NERC defined electronic security perimeter (ESP).
The following topics describe Secure Firewall (Sidewinder) features that address current issues pertaining to critical infrastructure protection requirements. Recommendations to expand current capabilities are contained in the Suggested Product Roadmap section.
Defense in depth
Just as there is not a single medicine to heal all ailments there is not one security technique that mitigates all threats. The Secure Firewall that was assessed provides multiple layers of security employing techniques to detect and mitigate security threats. These include an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), Virus Scanning (add-on), TrustedSource™ (reputation service), Geo-Location, and SmartFilter™ to control users' access to the Internet.
Principle of least privilege
The principle of least privilege is to give users/processes the rights necessary to do their work but no more. The Secure Firewall uses a patented technology called Type Enforcement™ that limits each user/process to a specific domain. If that domain were compromised the other domains would still be safe, e.g. if email were compromised the web server would still be secure. The Secure Firewall also by default restricts communication between zones putting the onus on the system administrator to allow necessary communication.
Proxy Agents
Proxies provide more granular control of network traffic. Proxy agents are defined to force network traffic to comply with protocol standards. The Secure Firewall currently has proxy agents for a number of protocols including DNS, FTP, H323, HTTP and HTTPS, which are becoming more prevalent in control system networks.
IDS / IPS
Intrusion Detection and Protection systems are common place in today's IT networks but they are still nascent in the control systems world. In recent years a small number of signatures have been written to look for specific vulnerabilities in control systems. The Secure Firewall provides signature and anomaly based intrusion detection and has a configurable response mechanism. Currently there are 28 signatures defined that support SCADA protocols (MODBUS/TCP, DNP3/TCP, and ICCP/TCP).
Remote access
Control systems in the electric power industry and many other critical infrastructure areas are typically very geographically dispersed and require remote access to the system. Many commercially available products allow VPN connections granting a user access to the remote network. The Secure Firewall adds the ability to enforce firewall rules specific to individual VPN connections.
Interface communication
There significant business drivers creating the need to get data from the control network to business network. The ability to do this in an intrinsically secure manner is still quite difficult. One very important feature of the Secure Firewall is the ability to set interfaces to transmit and/or receive only, or any combination. This functionality could be very useful for creating a secure data transfer path for communication flowing from a high security network (e.g. a control center) and a lower secure network (e.g. the corporate network). More information on the ability of the Secure Firewall to function as a logical data diode is requested.
Port Communication
As stated above current control systems operate on implicit trust. The Secure Firewall provides authentication mechanisms to prohibit allowed traffic until authentication occurs. This helps assure that communications are valid and aids operators in defining and enforcing their security perimeter which is a requirement for the NERC CIP standards.
Redundancy
The Secure Firewall supports the industry's requirement of high availability for controls systems by providing firewall load sharing and redundant high availability (HA) failover capabilities.
Test Environment
A typical control system network contains numerous connections to other networks, organizations, and remote facilities. The number of connections can literally be in the thousands, making securing such an environment a significant challenge. The connections may utilize serial and/or routable protocols, a variety of communication mediums, and often require redundant communication pathways. The following diagram depicts an example of a complicated network design typical of an environment where the Secure Firewall would be deployed. A brief discussion on data acquisition schemes, also known as telemetry, is required to fully understand the predictable nature of control system communication. Telemetry is the method SCADA servers use to retrieve information from field devices. This communication is extremely predictable, and deviation from the communication pattern highly discernable. For each field device, a SCADA server will request known data types. For example, the status of breakers and the frequency and voltage of the electric grid, are requested at regular intervals. Below is a diagram depicting a minute broken into twosecond time slices. Every two seconds, the status of breakers is requested. Once a minute frequency and voltage are requested. Note that more than one request can be made during a time slice.
A control system network utilizes a variety of data types to ensure reliable operations of the infrastructure environment. The following table identifies the data types, their purpose within a control system, and data timing requirements. 
Routing between Zones (called "Burbs")
This section describes the firewall rules for routing between zones.
Business to/from DMZ
The business zone is also the Internet/External zone. There is a need for business systems to gather information from the process control network for billing, scheduling, and other business needs. For the purpose of the assessment there were three rules created. The first allows for read only access to a file share in the DMZ, the second used pre-existing rules to allow MS-SQL queries to be made to a database, and the third rule allows NERC eTag (XML/HTTP) traffic to flow to a single device in the DMZ.
DMZ to/ from Control Center
The control center is the final destination for much of the traffic on the process control network. The data that is needed for business reasons in the business network is pushed to the DMZ from the Control Center/Internal zone. This includes the three data streams in the previous section, MS-SQL, File share, and NERC eTags.
Control Center to/from the Process Control Network (PCN)
Devices on the process control network (PCN) use many different protocols. Many rules were necessary to support these protocols and to allow for proper communications to and from these devices. It would be advised to create a service group similar to the Internet Service group that had the necessary services and rules pre-built for process control networks. The most prevalent protocols for process control networks are ModBus and DNP. The Secure Firewall does not currently provide support for monitoring or filtering serial communications, which is the most common control center medium. We tested the routable versions of these protocols. Other important protocols to consider for this service group would be FTP, OPC, Syslog, and HTTP.
Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) to/from PCN
The best practices recommend tunneling phasor measurement data via a VPN into the PCN. It is recommended that VPNs terminate in a virtual zone and then get routed to the proper destination or endpoint zone. Our network configuration did not allow for this setup and further research needs to be done to determine the best configuration for transferring PMU data.
Testing Notes
The Secure Firewall successfully passed the ModBus-TCP and DNP for IP. It also alerted on these protocols when probed with known malicious traffic. We tested the following protocols in further detail.
Secure DNP:
Secure DNP is a relatively new addition to the DNP protocol. We tested to see how the Secure Firewall would respond fearing that it may alert that it is malicious traffic. Initially the Secure Firewall alerted on "non DNP traffic on DNP Port". After looking into closer detail it was a configuration error on the slave device. Once the devices were configured correctly the alerts stopped and both normal DNP and Secure DNP pass through without alert.
Phasor Data:
Broadcast:
The initial test attempted to capture PMU (i.e., phasor data) that was on the broadcast IP address of one subnet/zone and redirect into another subnet/zone. The Secure Firewall did not allow this to occur. We also attempted to send the phasor data from the phasor measurement device to the broadcast address of another zone without success.
Directed UDP:
Directed UDP traffic was sent from the relay device that generated the data directly to receiving host in another zone and was passed correctly and accurately.
Latency:
Latency is a major concern with real-time systems.. We looked at the latency in phasor data. It is transmitted at up to 120 times per second and must be timely in order to be useful to operators. I tested the processing time on the directed UDP phasor data being transmitted at a typical 30 times per second. I captured traffic entering on both the receiving and the transmitting network interface cards and measured the latency between the two. The Secure Firewall adds latency between .00009 and .00017 seconds between receiving the packet, tearing down the connection, scanning the traffic for matches to the signatures, rebuilding the packet, and finally sending the packet out the destination interface. This latency would be considered insignificant and would not affect the desired near real-time quality of the data desired at the endpoint destination. This was an impressive attribute of the Secure Firewall considering the process that was just described. It should be noted that this capability was assessed on a noncongested link but appears to be more than sufficient for handling phasor data.
Observations
Security includes people as well as technologies. That is, the ability for personnel to interact with technologies deployed within their company's security environments. The perimeter security team at PNNL is familiar with a variety of products that perform security functions commonly employed in multiple and complex computing environments. Their observations and first impressions on ease of use and functionality are included below. This is important as operators in critical infrastructure who are tasked with managing the Secure Firewall, depending on their level of experience or time on the job, may or may not be familiar with such advanced IT or firewall technologies.
Graphical User Interface
The Secure Firewall has a look and feel consistent with similar type products and capabilities. This consistency would be expected of any device commonly available on the commercial market. Many IT technologies attempt to ensure a standard look and feel especially where monitoring, maintenance, and responses are required of trained personnel. The management interface/GUI used with the Secure Firewall appliance has many of the same attributes and layouts that are easily recognized by anyone familiar with computer/software user interfaces.
Initial Use
The Secure Firewall is no more difficult to learn than other products. While there are some new terms and a new layout, the Secure Firewall has a learning curve comparable to other firewall products. One can quickly come up to speed and configure the Secure Firewall with a basic knowledge of networking and firewalls.
Viewing Rules
Finding a specific rule is easy with the search feature provided in the GUI, however finding a specific 'rule set' is challenging. There is a substantial amount of information required to define a specific rule and displaying all this information would quickly make a display cumbersome and crowded. Yet the ability to view this information when needed is very beneficial. Currently a mechanism to view and/or sort rules by a specific attribute is not provided. We offer two recommendations to improve viewing rules. 1. The ability to filter the rules based on zone or interface. Management of the rules otherwise is more difficult and time consuming. Providing a mechanism to view configuration rules per interface or zone would be beneficial to operators of the Secure Firewall. 2. Provide mouse over capabilities to see more details to the rules/services. The way that the Secure Firewall defines services and then uses the services to define rules allows for easy reuse and modularity but it also obfuscates exactly what a rule is doing. The rule set only shows the service name not what ports it contains. This could lead to unnecessary rules and unexpected holes in zone communication.
Note: The Secure Firewall may have already undergone some changes in normal product improvement cycles. However, the version that we assessed did not contain such changes.
VPN Configuration
VPNs are frequently used in the control system networks. The Secure Firewall provides a full set of VPN features. It includes the ability to limit VPN connections to specific IP addresses and/or subnets. This is very beneficial when connecting two static locations and commonly desired in control systems environments especially where routable protocols are utilized. We encountered a slight problem when configuring the VPN in VPN Properties. First, we had to erase previous work and exit the VPN Properties screen to go back to another screen to configure the pools and groups needed in the VPN Properties screen. It would be useful if one could configure new pools, groups, etc within the VPN Properties screen.
Suggested Product Roadmap Features for Future CIP Capabilities Enhanced Anomaly Detection
Ensure anomaly detection capabilities support the predictable nature of SCADA communication. Both the communicating devices and the communication patterns are well known and consistent. The ability to detect a device communicating out of turn, too frequently, or not frequently enough, or a new device altogether would be indicative of potential malicious activity. The ability to monitor communications for variations from their predictable patterns would be a very powerful tool, as the content of malicious and non-malicious traffic is often indecipherable.
Enhanced Rule Views
The ability to sort firewall rules by zone would assist in maintenance. There is at times an animosity between control system and IT staff at a utility. Call it distrust or lack of appreciation for the other's environment. In short, these products may be deployed and maintained by staff whose primary purpose is not perimeter security. The ability to easily access all rules for a zone would assist in maintenance and limit security holes through mis-configurations.
Support for Phasor Data
Synchro-phasor measurements aid in detecting and mitigating an unstable power grid. The ability to move this data around is very important to the bulk electricity industry. Support for inter-zone broadcast traffic would allow all currently available phase-angle communications to be processed.
Support for MPLS
Support for MPLS is desirable. Utilities are considering MPLS to provide a redundant communication environment. MPLS supports a backup control center located far distant from the primary control center. MPLS allows this to occur without the need for redundant communication media to remote substations.
Support for Serial Communications
The primary method to monitor and control our nation's critical infrastructure is via serial ports and protocols. Our interviews with industry show that serial protocols will be in use for the next 20 to 30 years. To date there has been a dearth of research and development in securing this critical piece to our national infrastructure. Currently the ability to adequately secure serial communication does not exist. Adding serial support to the Secure Firewall and its related technologies (e.g. Trusted Source™, and anomaly detection) would provide the serial community with a security tool that currently is unavailable.
Expanded Filters/Proxies
Develop working relationship with energy management system vendors (e.g. AREVA, Siemens, GE, ABB, Telvent) and develop filters to secure the protocols used to communicate between the operator console and the SCADA/Communications server.
Control System Specific Service Rules and Signature Groups
Anything that can be done to simplify the configuration and deployment will increase security. Two easy enhancements would be to create process control system protocol services rules (e.g. DNP, ModBus, OPC etc) and IPS Signature groups for the SCADA/PCS signatures.
Emphasis on Reliable Operations
The emphasis on reliable operations in industry today doesn't effectively address the necessity to identify cyber security vulnerabilities and provide effective mitigation measures. However, the groundwork is well underway for increasing the vigilance necessary to ensure reliable operations in our Nation's critical infrastructure. Recognition at all levels of government, industry, and the public of that one very important component of reliable operations is the assurance that this infrastructure is protected from the damaging effects that can be caused by cyber attacks from far-reaching and well disguised cyber adversaries. To understand, and maintain current with, the vulnerabilities that have been established as a top ten list, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) program has provided initial recommended mitigation strategies to this list in the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Another valuable contribution to the overall mission and goals of providing reliable operations is the comprehensive efforts by the Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery & Energy Reliability's "Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the Energy Sector". 2 This effort captures the effort currently being applied to ensure that short and long term solutions are coordinated within government organizations, national laboratories, industry partners, and vendors to provide consistent, stable, and efficient methods for implementing cyber security.
Many of the attributes of this groundwork are being actively addressed through the foresight of vendors, such as Secure Computing, to ensure their products meet current and future capabilities for securing critical infrastructure assets and infrastructure. The Secure Firewall (Sidewinder) product has many of these capabilities and specific features that will effectively support this mission. The features of the Secure Firewall that were reported in this assessment adequately fit the current cyber security needs for securing and protecting critical infrastructure. An example would be the isolation of control system perimeters from corporate or other adjacent networks by an appropriate combination of firewall traffic management and DMZ configurations. This effort effectively meets the need to eliminate weaknesses in control system perimeter protection and increase the difficulty for an external attacker to exploit vulnerabilities. This is simply one important example as illustrated in the DOE-NSTB "Lessons Learned From Cyber Security Assessments of SCADA and Energy Management Systems" 3 . Additionally the Secure Firewall (Sidewinder) has appropriately addressed the entire set of vendor recommendations provided in this report identified as Actions #1 through #5 (Section 4.2 Recommendations for System Vendors) which remain current actions for the 2009 control system vulnerability environment thus resulting in increased reliability through the Secure Firewall security attributes and features.
Conclusions
Based on the report herein, PNNL's assessment of the Secure Firewall is that it contains the features necessary for a robust CIP CI/KR security program. Some of the most apparent capabilities are the tiered approach to security otherwise known as defense-in-depth, high availability, application of least privilege and providing a strong boundary between IT and control/ICS/SCADA systems.
A number of future modifications could be made to the Secure Firewall to make it even more valuable to the control system industry including enhanced rule sorting, support for MPLS, better configuration for VPNs and customized service rules and signature groups. Adding serial support would be a unique and extremely beneficial feature for this community.
Future modifications, some of which may have already been addressed in subsequent improvements and revisions or planned improvements of the Secure Firewall product, should also continue to be aligned with the overall protection requirements and needs of the control system environments as identified by emerging regulatory expectations and developed standards for acceptable practices.
Finally, there are many other standards and reports that contain cyber security attributes desirable of vendor solutions applied in control system environments. To decrease the challenge of addressing these attributes, the Secure Firewall (Sidewinder) appliance could effectively be deployed in many current control system environments. Where recommendations have been made to increase the effectiveness of the Secure Firewall for applicable use in future control system environments, the reviewers are confident that such capabilities could be identified by the vendor's development roadmap and continued interaction with the efforts of government policymakers, the national laboratories, and industry advisory groups. 
